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We want to open here with our distinguished visitor this year. Mr. Olpin graduated from
Brigham Young University in 1955. He got his law degree from Columbia University in 1958.
At that time he joined O'Melveney and Myers in Los Angeles. He's now a partner there. In
the interim he has been a professor at the University of Utah College of Law and at the
University of Texas School of Law. Mr. Olpin is a well·known figure in the natural resources
legal world. And from there I will give the podium to Professor Getches to tell about that.
David Getches: Thank you very much. There are, of course, many things we could ask
Owen Olpin to do today. He has a lot to say as you see from what he said about his
background. He has a diverse background experience. Many of you know him, either because
you were in the practicing bar or as students because you've heard that Owen Olpin is coming
here, and that be's an interesting person, and that he's a leading practitioner at the law firm of
O'Melveney and Myers in Lcis Angeles, that he's practiced in the areas of oil and gas, public
lands, and environmental law. Many of you know that he's a Special Master in the Supreme
Court's original case involving Wyoming and Nebraska. Others of you know him as a
distinguished law teacher. He has taught at the University of Utah, also visited at Texas and
recenOy at American University. He's the author of a number of articles that you run across in
your water law case book and other places. He's a negotiator and a deal-maker. He's been
involved in Alaska oil and gas development.
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But as interesting all these things are, at least as interesting to me, and I hope to you,
is Owen Olpin's concern for the profession, for the natural world, and for family and human
·
values -- things that really count. He cares for the future of lawyers in our society, for what they
do for and to society. He has a great concern, and whether his concern is justified you can
judge for yourself for the avarice that Jaw is bringing out in people today. The lawyer jokes will
not be indulged here, but this concern about whether or not law is a business or law is a
profession is something that we all need to talk about. Will the Douglas Brackmans around us
and within us win out is the question of the day. His concern for the out-of-doors has brought
Owen into contact with the natural world. He's biked through and I understand been lost in
some of the most remote and beautiful places in the West, and indeed in the world. One of his
recent treks logged seVeral pounds off of him in NepaL I have to tell you that once I called
Owen -- and this story tells you a little bit about his character - to speak at some occasion, he
gave me the best excuse anybody's ever given me in turning me down for one of these things.
He said that be and his teenage son were headed out to take a major trek in the mountains,
that this was a matter of birthday tradition for his kids, and that tells you something about
Owen the man.
I know a lot of students and a number of lawyers wonder if a love for the natural world,
the unspoiled aspect of nature, respect for ecology, is mutually exclusive with representing

development interests 'and working for a big law firm in environmental law. These ~ncems are
Owen's too. So we asked Owen to talk about the kinds of things that cbaracteriz.e btm as a
person to talk about the ethics of natural resources Jaw and practice, and be's going to do that
today. He's going to talk from his experience and I think his heart too.
·

•
Thank you, David. That was most generous. Not very well deserved, but thank you
anytvay. I want this monologue to end very quickly and I want to go back and forth in a burry.
But let me say a few thing;; to set the stage. F1CSt, Jet me give you one personal statement, so
you'll know a little bit more about me. It's something that I try to balance. Let me tell you also
about a person who will soon become my partner in the Washington office of O'Melveney and
Myers. Then let me set a couple of fact situations before you, and then let's talk.
First, as to my situation. I am, like most human being;;, I suppose, made up of a lot of
complex thing;;, but perhaps the most. interesting to today's discussion, let's pick one
.
organization that I presently serve as a member of the board of trustees, and that is the Sterra
Club Legal Defense Fund, not to be confused with the Sierra aub. The Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund is a public interest law firm that litigates on behalf of environmental causes. I am
also a partner in the law firm of O'Melveney and Myers, and on two occasions I have
represented clients who were opposed by the Sierra Oub Legal Defense Fund. In both cases, I
called the executive director and said, •Erect that wall again. I'm going to be representing the
other side this time. Seal off any information so that I get nothing as a board member that has
anything to do with this matter, because on this matter I'm on the other side: Have I taken a
position that you regard as defensible? Or is that kind of arrangement indefensible as a matter
of principle?
The second again is a new partner I'm going to have in the Washington office very soon.
I had a f!ili' amount to do with recruiting this guy. The guy's name is Richard Ayres. Some of
you will have heard of him. Dick Ayres was one of the founding members of the Natural
Resources Defense Council in New York. Very early on in his career, he moved from New
York to Washington and has been very active for twenty years as a clean air lawyer in a public
interest law firm. He completed a rnonument in his life's work last fall when Congress finally at
long last passed the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
For a number of personal and professional reasons he has decided that now it's time for
him to have another chapter in his life. He is going to become my partner, and the primary
thing that we expect that he will do is represent firms, corporations that are regulated by the
aean Air Act Amendments of 1990. You can imagine the kind of things be will be called on to
do, the kind of advice he will be called on to give. Is there any principle applicable to him that
ought to trouble us today as we talk about these issues? Has he sold out?
Now, let me give you the two circumstances that I want you to think about, and then we
will just take off from there. Case number one- actual case- in 1969 the U.S. .Justice
Department brought an action against the four American automobile manufacturers, the then
four major automobile manufacturers. The complaint was that there was a conspiracy among
the automobile manufacturers to restrain the development and installation of anti-pollution
technology for automobiles. Within a few months, within the same year that litigation was
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settled, and a consent decree was entered. Not too surprisingly, the lawyers in the Justice
Department who entered into that consent decree were criticized and Criticized severely for not
having been tough enough, and for having settled a case that ought to have been tried with .the
automobile companies being pinned to the wall.
More surprisingly there was a strong current of criticism in some quarters of the lawyers
representing the automobile manufactures. The general tenor of that criticism was that what
was involved ~ so important to our society a.nd the.alleged misconduct was so serious that the
lawyers for the automobile companies should have urged, perhaps even have insisted, that their
clients go through a public trial so that that issue could receive a public hearing. So, again, to
be clear, what was urged was that the lawyers for the defendant automobile companies owed an
obligation to ~ociety to at least counsel their clients against entering into that kind of a consent
decree.
The second circumstance that I want to mention is outside the environmental area but
helps make the point that I hope we will spend some time with. This is a recent opinion of the
District of Columbia Federal District Court Judge Stanley Sporkin. He was dealing with a
matter ·-we won't get into the facts, because they don't matter for the 'purposes of our
discussion - but it was the Lincoln Savings and Loan debacle. I'm going to just simply quote a
I don't need to elaborate. This tells what was in his
couple of sentences from his opinion.
mind.
He says, "Where were the outside accountants and attorneys when these transactions
were effectuated? What is difficult to understand is why at least one professional would not
have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching that took place in this case." Similar theme to
the criticism of the counsel for the automobile companies. That is, did the lawyers for Lincoln
Savings & Loan have an obligation to institutional values beyond those of the selfish interests of
the clients? And did they violate those values? Judge Sporkin's sentences could be read to
suggest that he thought maybe they did in failing to stop the abuses that led to the most serious
of the savings and loans crises we have seen yet.

If I can talk you into it, I wou.ld like to stop just at that point and explore any dimensions
of this thing that you want to explore, including getting a shot at me as to whether what I've
done in my two capacities as lawyer for commercial interests and trustee of Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund is defensible. Your tum!
.
Q #1: In view of your claimed commitment to the environment, why do you need to
represent those whose conduct is harmful to the environment?

A:. Well, that's fair. Let me put it this way. My life would be less complex, certainly, if
I simply acted as a lawyer only for those causes with which I was entirely comfortable. I would
avoid ever having my stomach tied in knots and life would be much simpler. And I'm not sure
you're asking exactly that same question, but that's the theme I bear from you.
The fact that I chose this profession, I think it would naive in the extreme to assume the
day that I decided t.o become a lawyer, that like Perry Mason all my clients would
serendipitously tum out to be innocent. I have represented some guilty scoundrels, not in the
criminal sense, but in the noncriminal sense. I can't tell you that all of my clients have been
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honorable, right people who should have won. So in part I realize in a w~y I'm d~cking your
question. But I made that choice when I decided to become a lawyer. D1dn't I?
0 #2: You didn't agree to represent polluters did you?

A: Why not?

0 #3: Is it possible to counsel clients to do the "right• thing for the environment when
that is not what they ask you to do? Can you jUst refuse to take clients that do things you don't
like?
A: There's the answer. That's a part of the Faustian bargain if you want to call it tba~,
that all lawyers make. Let me put it another way. A crit!cism that was voiced very loudly agatn
and again back in the turbulent Sixties, goes something like this. I used it with a group of
students at breakfast this morning. The criticism is articulated this way: In a societywherelaw
is a primary force, lawyers should not be secondary beings. Lawyers should be primary beings and
take the burden of their advocacy, the outcome of what they argue for on behalf of their clients is
something they should be able to live with for society as a whole. Now just so that we don't waste
too much time, Jet me make clear how I feel about it. I think that theory is rubbish!
Nonetheless, it is a theory that was espoused by a very popular and charismatic professor at the
Yale Law School, Charles Reich, who had quite a following in the Sixties. I haven't heard much
of Professor Reich lately, but he was a very effective spokesman for a point of view which I
think is wrong. I do believe that when I became a lawyer, I was obliged to remind myself that I
would not always champion causes that as a.member of society I would favor.
Q #4: How have you personally responded when prospective clients have asked for
assistance in achieving ends that you think are selfish and wrong because of the environmental
harm that might be caused? ·

A: rm not sure that the way I personally handled it is terribly relevant, but let me just
spin off a few things and then you can chew it up. First, having taken the position I've taken,
contrary to Professor Reich's thesis, I buy on to the proposition that as a lawyer in a very
meaningful sense I am a secondary being. That the client is entitled to have my undivided
loyalty, to assume that I will bold in confidence things conveyed to ~ in confidence, that I will
not clutter my representation of that client with things that are extraneous to that client's
objectives, whether you consider them selfish or otherwise.
Now, having said that, let me tell you about the two areas where I do declare my
independence. One, the canons are very clear, the code of professional responsibility is very
clear; there are some lines that I can and must draw. I can't help my client engage in obviously
illegal conduct in the future. I can't do obviously improper things like fabricate evidence, etc.
You know, the obvious ones, the easy ones, so that's very easy. But going off into that there is
another area where I can consistently declare my independence. When the doors cl~ and the
client and I are in the room alone, I can try to have the client listen to the better side of its
passions. I can say, ~ow wait a minute. Have you thought, of the public relations implications
of the path that you seem determined to go down?" So I can joggle my client. But if the client
doesn't listen, it's the client's word, not mine. I think I have to ~ake the commitment.
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The other area where I declare my independence iS in the area outside of the four
comers of my relationship with the clienL Best example is to go back to my membership on the
board of trustees of the Sierra Qub Legal Defense Fund. Any client, who tells me that they
don't like me serving on that board are going 1o be told the limits of their authority over my life.
The fact that outside the relationship I might displease my client, I might support causes with
which my client is in disagreement philosophically, but that are not involved in my
representation of that client, is my business. In a sensitive case of the kind that I descnbe
where I've been on the other side from the Sierra Oub Legal Defense Fund, you can well
imagine that there is some careful talking that goes on before I make those commitments. I
make sure that peopl~ on both sides of that know where I am so that they can decide whether
they•re comfortable in having me proceed. And there will probably be occasions, though they
haven't happened yet, where someone will be told, "Look, Owen, I just can't have you
representing me because you have shown a philosophical bias by being a member of the board
of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund that just makes me uncomfortable." At that point, I say.
"Well you better get another lawyer with whom you are comfortable, because a comfortable
relationship between lawyer and client is temoly important."

Q #5: I certainly take precautions to see that my actions as a lawyer would not cause
me to be uncomfortable as a citizen.
A:. How would you do that?
Q #6: In your terms, I would choose to be a primary being and take responsibility for
the results of the representations I agree to take on. I would not be available to those who do
hann. I see no reason why I need to be placed in a position to compromise my strongly held
values about matters such as sound energy policy.

A:. I have to come back to you and tell you again that I've.conceded I'm a secondary
being. I've conceded that as a lawyer I have bought into a profession that says that when I hire
on, that I am carrying out my client's purposes. and beyond what I've already said in response to
the previous question about the opportunities I have when the doors close to lecture a client on
the bett~r way. it strikes me that unless you ca_n help me see a construct that I can deal with
against my own vision of what the adversary system is all about, I can't be very helpful to you.
Let's take your example. You have certain strongly felt convictions about energy policy.
Now where does that take you?
Q #7: I would refuse to take clients who act adversely to sound energy policy as I see iL

A: Sure, that•s alwayS an option. There will be no shortage of lawyers willing to
represent an oil company or a coal company, and one choice you clearly have as a lawyer is to
say, "My stomach woo•t tolerate iL I've got philosophical convictions that are too important to
me. You'll have to get another lawyer." Sure, that's fine. I have no trouble with that. I would
feel more concerned if you said that if there were an accused rapist or murderer because there
might be a more difficult time finding someone to replace you to represent someone in that
circumstance. But in the case of the oil company I coal company set up. I say fine. if you don't
lilce it. don·~ take it on.
5

0 #8: Have clients sought you out to be their attorney because of your environmental
connections?
A; That's an interesting question. As a matter of fact, I've had sort of side-bar
conversations about that and Jet me tell you bow they've gone. I can almost reconstruct the
dialogue. I've never thought of it in the way you raise it, so it's a good question. As I go
through this' disclosure process that I've described where I make sure everyone knows ~bat my
history is, I've had one client say to me on one occasion, and I can now remember it quite
vividly, •Owen, we're comfortable. We don't mind that you've been on the side of the Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund and that you're on their board. You know how thosepeoplethink.
You, in dealing with them as an adversary, will have perhaps an added notch of credibility."

Now, my answer when I heard that was to say, "Look, you're kidding yourself if you think
they'll go easy because I'm on the other side. It ain•t gonna happen. If there's anything you
have to worry about, it is whether there might be an added combativeness or flowing of
competitive juices, because a trustee is on the other side, and it might burt you. But you're not
going to get anything because I'm the opposing lawyer by reason of that relationship."

I think they believed me. I think I conveyed the message that if anything, that line of
thinking was a reason not to retain me instead of to retain me. Is that responsive?

0 #9: Does SCLDF object to O'Melveny taking clients who have bad environmental
records?

A: That's a good question. The answer is so far not an issue, and I'll tell you why. The
concept of the public interest Jaw firm, the way it was brought into being - and I've been on
several boards along the years ·• the very concept is that we need to operate within the system,
we need to create an institution that can fill a void in the adversary system and represent
.
interests that might not otherwise be represented. One of the thing..; we need is the support, the
counsel of the regular bar. So they bad to strike a bargain with people like me, the only way we
can get people like Olpin to sign on and serve on the board is if we don't frustrate their
professional aspirations. If I bad to say I'm going to resign each time a case came along where I
was on the other side, then all people who practice the kind of law I practice would be disabled
from being on the board. Now that's one way to go.
Let me concede something. Some of my partners take the position that the mere
possibility of the awkwardness you talk about should have had me decline to serve on the board.
I disagree with them: I agreed to. serve on the board. But ifs a very good question and not an
easy one to answer.
Q #10: What is your firm's _pro bono policy?

A; A couple of things I can say in response. It's a pitiful amount, but the Los Angeles
County Bar (I think it is the County rather than the State Bar) has come up with the notion that
all lawyers in Los Angeles ought to give at least 35 hours a year. Our flrm buys on to that. We
urge that pro bono commitments be made. The firm goes so far as to have a committee that
bas as its principal function matching lawyers and pro bono opportunities so that there is a rea)
world opportunity to do this sort of thing f?r lawyers who are so inclined. Apart from that there
6

is a general urging of lawyers to participate, to be good citizens of the community, and to
contribute however the lawyers want to contribute.
Now, let's take it outside the e~vironmental area. We're not talking about just

environmental pro bono: we're talking about doing good things for the community. The law
firm signs on very strongly that that's important, tries to facilitate it, tries to make that
possibility a real one. One of the things that I worry a lot about is the increasing concern for
the bottom line in law firms, whether that is going to continue to get bona fide treatment,
whether we are really going to continue to be generous over time. But our law ·firm makes all of
the right noises and I think largely delivers.

Q #11: It seems like you are two different people. How do you reconcile these two
sides?

A:. That's a good question. I don't know that I'll have a very satisfactory answer. I
guess it goes back to an earlier que.<ition: Do you like complexity? I guess I do because I find
myself in complex situations all the time and have learned to live with it. I guess I think I've
made that accommodation satisfactorily. One thing tha~ helps me is buyirig on to what I've said
in disagreeing with Professor Reich. I think that our system, though not perfect, is a good one,
our adversary system. .One of the tenets of that system is loyalty to the adversarial process, 'to
the principles that govern the adversarial process. Let me bring out a little bit more completely
what I mean. I do not think it necessary or even appropriate that the Sierra aub Legal
Defense Fund win all its cases just as I do not believe it appropriate that the Legal Aid Society
get acquittals on all criminal cases. It is vital that the adversarial system be balanced in that
everyone has access to legal services. Therefore, a large part of my agenda is achieved if the
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund is avatlable and renders that service as needed, winning and
losing cases as lawyers win and lose cases. And it doesn't bother me a whole lot - maybe I'm
insensitive - if one of the cases they lose is one where I whop 'em. Now does that make me a
disloyal member ~f the board of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund? An argument can be
made, yea, it does -- I ought not to be trying to beat an organization that's a part of what I do.
Life is complex.
Q #12: How can you represent someone that you know does not support the legal
requirements for environmental protection?
A.; That's a perfectly fair question, and it's one that people can differ about. Let me
first take the case that most of us usually have Jess trouble with though it's not without its
trouble. You are representing someone charged with a serious crime and however you came to
know it - let's not worry about it, but- you know he's done it! You have no ambiguity in your
mind that person is as guilty as all get-out. Armed with that knowledge, should that in any way
compromise your professional obligation to your client? You might very well say yes. You
might very well say, •okay, that person is guilty. At some point if it looks like he's going to get
off, I've got to try less hard, or I've got to do something so that society will come out all right on
that Most of us by the time we've decided that we're going to be lawyers, answer that fairly
simplistically. That's not my role. My role as a •secondary being• is by definition a role that
says my client can repose complete confidence in me, can know that I don't have a larger social
agenda, that I have a professional obligation to that client wiiliin the bounds of the rules of the
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game •• the code of professional responsibility and the rules of law that place limits. on how I ·
can represent my client's interests.
But think of it another way if you will. If the client thought that at some; point you were
going to step over on the other side and say, "Well, sorry Client, at this point I'm leaving you
because my stomach won't let me go any further with you, and I'm going to help the other side
just a little bit." What does that do to the kind of relationship that ought to exist between a
client and a lawyer? It erodes it, perhaps destroys it. If we are right in the way we've
structured our adversary system, that there is something important about the relationship
between a lawyer and a client, that tends to support my proposition that, like it or not, to a very
large degree we're secondary beings.
Q #13: Your position cannot be defended as being principled because you do not
question or challenge conduct you know to be wrong. You do have freedom as a lawyer to ask
hard questions and to learn whether you are being asked to be an instrument to cause pollution
or other environmental harm. If you have the beliefs that you say you have, beliefs that cause
you to support the Siena Qub Legal Defense Fund, don't you have to find out whether you are
being hired as a lawyer to subvert the very values to which you subscribe. I'm sorry I can't let
you off with what seems to me nothing more than a cop-out by saying that any harm done is
done by the client and that you bear no responsibility for the skills you exert as a lawyer that
make it all possible. You don't have to take on all matters that are presented to you. You can
just say no.

A: I thought you were picking an argument with me, but by the time you were through
talking it seems to me we're entirely in agreement. Can you help me understand where we're
still arguing? Because you seem to be saying, and you tell me if I mischaracterize your position,
that I do have freedom not to take on causes that I regard to be noxious, and that I ought to
have a conscience, perhaps, in picking and choosing my clients; but I think I also heard you say
that you will take the next step with me, that once I've said, "Yes, I'll take you on", that at that
point my obligations as a professional follow. Now, am I missing something, because I thought
that's the position I had rather clearly staked out

Q #14: I do not think I should have to take on any client who is not pro-environment.
A: Do I take it, then, that for your part, you would choose only to take the cases with
which you bad a high -- let me put it in slightly colored language - that you have a fairly high
level of moral comfort? - that when you hang up a shingle, if you're not a lawyer already, and I
understand I've got both lawyers and non-lawyers in the .room •• but when you become a lawyer,
clients are going to have to pass at least some kind of moral litmus test or they're not going to
become your clients?

Q #15: I concede that in some circumstances I may have an obligation to defend
persons who are charged with wrongful conduct, even of conduct that is harmful to the
environment I would be willing to consider helping an individual who needs help and cannot
afford a lawyer. I may feel an obligation in some circumstances to individuals.

A:. But not to corporate America? That's not an issue?
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Q #16: Do you ever tum down a matter? No matter bow offended you may be at the
conduct of a prospective client?

A: Sure. Good Question. I suppose that a part of your answer is that I do have my
test. I have to admit to you that I draw lines. I have bad clients come to me and I have shown
them the door. I guess I sense that from the way that you and I are going back and forth with
one another you would show more of them the door than I would. That's fine.
Q #17: And I think you should be more prepared than you seem to be to show the door
to prospective clients who commit serious offenses against the environment and who
·
purposefully undermine values you say you_are committed to.

A: Let me go back to my opening comment about my would-be partner Dick Ayres, my
soon-to-be-partner Dick Ayres. I talked to another lawyer, a very fine lawyer in San Francisco
who's been involved in public interest law 8 long time, and I said, "Are you interested in
considering 8 position with our firm?" And his answer was different than Dick Ayres. He said,
"Look, Owen, it's appealing, there are many things about it that I would like, but I have made a
personal choice" - and it was your choice - be said. "''ve chosen for whatever purpose that I'll
be always on the side of the white hats.• I said ''Floe, I understand. Go ahead. I wish you well,
Roger: Dick Ayres, who in my mind is equally committed to environmental values, made the
opposite choice. I don't fault either of them.
Q #18: What do you do as a SCLDF board member when an attorney wants you to
approve litigation aimed at delaying development? How do you handle the "Rule Eleven"
problem that such litigation might raise?
A: Let me quickly carve out some limitations on my expertise so you will know how
much not to listen to me. Ftrst, I am not a trial lawyer; I am very seldom involved myself in
litigation. I know what Rule Eleven is, and you have just beard the sum total of my expertise on
Rule Eleven. So I'm a very poor person to talk to on that. But let me not duck your question
entirely. Let me tell you that you put an issue that I think is a tough one. I have listened to
people on the environmental side talk rather openly about delay as a weapon, and who use delay
to try to kill a project by increasing the economic cost of the project. I think that does pose
tough Rule Eleven kinds of issues. I guess one way to look at it is if you've got at least some
colorable arguments that some judge might buy, then you're in a position back to some of the
other things I've said. It's not your job to judge whether those arguments are ultimately good
arguments or bad. That's the judge's job. Your task is to urge; the judge's task is to decide.
And you can rationalize doing it if you want to.
I wouJ.d also understand if you took a moral position that, "Look, in my scheme of things,
that is an abuse of the system. I take seriously being an officer of the court and I'm not going
to be a party to that."
Q #19: In your role as counselor to your clients don't you have an ethical responsibility
to try to influence their actions to take a more pro-environment approach?

A: Or I can swallow hard and I can say, "Okay, the client bas spoken" and I continue to
be my secondary person. So I think the path in the financial institutions is probably Jess
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controversial than in the environmental setting. The environmental setting, you make it a lot
harder, because you inject human lives, human health, you inject things about whicJi we all care
a great deal. At bottom, I think I'd probably come out the same place, regrettably. I don't have
any trouble with anything you say about the counseling function. I think a person who cares
about social values pr<?bably ought to in that circumstance do a lot of joggling -~ dreaming up
creative arguments as to why the client ought to see the better way. Point out the
unpleasantness of doing time for criminal environmental offenses. And more and more people
are doing time for those offenses. Point out the down-side in tetms of adverse publicity.
Ultimately, however, let's .take your precise case - all a client wants is a couple more years of
doing its evil deed. And the opportunity to persuade - in this case probably a regulatory agency
- or a legislative body - to hold off until more data comes in, to hold off while you know that
there is no need to hold off because enough data is in .and there is going to be a ruinous
outcome.
·
I think, David, there is a First Amendment issue there. It's not said usually in the terms
of a lawyer's obligation to the client, but one of our fundamental constitutional rights is to
petition the government for a redress of our grievances, and if I think I have a grievance as a
polluter to continue to spew hazardous wastes across the landscape, maybe I have a
constitutional right to at least argue for that.
. ¥aybe the best answer I can give you is, we're :still secondary beings. Our job is to carry
out the wishes of our client, the regulatory agency's job in a case such as you cite is to tell me
no. But I have a bard time even in the tough case you give me in saying that I can ultimately
insist that my client behave in the way that you and I would like the client to behave. I think
my choice at a certain point is either to buy on or to withdraw.

Q #20: But aren't you better off not taking on those matters in the fU'St place?
A: That's one way to see it. That's the theme that we have here, that the check-point is
not to take on a representation that you find offensive. I deny no lawyer the opportunity to
make that choice. I think that's perfectly permissible. But, Pete, again, my own view insists that
if you stay there, you play the game the way the adversary system's rules have been written.
You don't take on a client and then betray the obligation that you professionally accepted on
behalf of that client. Even if the client is a scoundrel. Scoundrels are entitled too, otherwise I'd
go broke.
It's been very nice to be with you. And thank you very much for stimulating a discussion
that I'm sure is going to continue. ·
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While my we of Professor Reich's perjorative characterization of lawyers as secondary
beings helped me make my points, I should not have ended the discussion without stating that I
dissent from the pejorative implications Professor Reieh intended to convey. I do not think it
fair or accurate to characterize a lawyer as a secondary being for elevating the obligations to
those whom the lawyer represents over his or her own interestS. Would we call trwtees of
trusts or guardians of minors or incompetents "secondary" because their fiduciary duties oblige
them to subordinate their own interests? Why then is a lawyer different? Indeed why is it not
acceptable and even laudable to subordinate one's own interest to the interests of clients, not
even excluding corporate clients.
Thw, in the final analysis I reject Professor Reich's denigration of lawyers as secondary
beings for their honoring professional obligations of loyalty to clients.
[end)
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